Monroe Karmin’s analysis of “The Politics of Nixon’s ‘Revolution’” (Feb. 11) suggests that the objective of the President’s revenue sharing proposal is to shift government attention and largesse away from the big central cities, and particularly the poor and black communities within them, and toward the suburban and rural areas where “Nixon people” are found.  There is a certain political logic to this, if one is willing to believe that presidents are strongly motivated by considerations of patronage.  But I think it is mostly wrong, and detracts from the more important issues that revenue sharing presents.

Whatever may be the merits of concentrating federal resources on rural areas, revenue sharing is an unlikely vehicle for the task.  The existing system of categorical grants-in-aid does redistribute tax money from the wealthier urban states to the less prosperous rural ones.  For example, in 1968 New York received from the federal government $313 per capita less than it had paid in income taxes, while North Dakota receive $180 per capita more than it had paid.  Revenue sharing would distribute funds according to population and local tax effort, and reduce this redistributive effect greatly.  The urban industrial states would get back a much larger share of their federal payments.  Governors Rockefeller and Ogilvie did not get where they are championing causes that lose them money.

A Less Than Fair Measure

Even the most urban states are really more suburban and rural than urban.  And, says Mr. Karmin, regardless of how much revenue sharing is earmarked for the hard-pressed big cities in these states, their claim on federal funds “seems likely to be sharply restricted.”  Compared to what?  A domestic “Marshall Plan”!  It seems less than fair to measure a president’s performance against the campaign slogans of the man he defeated.  Had Mr. Humphrey been elected would we have an urban “Marshall Plan” today?  Assuming that he took his campaign slogan seriously, he would first have had to figure out what it meant—different from, say, urban renewal (under which even modest programs now take over ten years to complete, and which frequently has difficulty spending all the money appropriated to it) or Model Cities (which was once touted as something of a “Marshall Plan” itself).  Then he would have had to steer the program through Congress, which would have meant, if the Model Cities experience is any guide, “Marshall Plans” not only for the big cities but for many very small ones as well (at least as many as there are Senators and Congressmen on the appropriations committees).  Then he would have had to find the money to pay for the “Plans,” and he almost certainly would have ended up taking more money out of the big cities than he would have eventually turned back to them.

My point is that it is mere speculation to say that a Democratic administration would have spent more on the cities or on the poor.

Federal spending on urban social programs is higher today than it ever has been, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the federal budget.  If the President’s revenue sharing and welfare reform proposals are adopted it will be much higher still.  No doubt many would like it to be even higher (I am one), especially those who are not inconvenienced with the responsibility of preparing the federal budget.  Many will want more under any circumstances.  Our desires will always outstrip our means.

The importance of revenue sharing is not in the amount of money it would give out or even in the apportionment among the several layers of government.  The important point is that it changes the rules of the game, eliminating massive federal regulation and giving state and local officials far greater say over how federal funds are spent within their domains.

Mr. Karmin states that the President would like to do this “on the theory that they know best how to solve their problems.”  The theory, I think, is that such officials are elected by voters rather than hired by the Civil Service Commission.  They are subject to certain disciplines and obligations that federal employees may freely ignore, for example, the need to reconcile the competing interests of diverse groups of citizens and the need to meet payrolls.  Being politicians they must follow not only their private instincts and attitudes but those of the public as well; being executives they must not only promise but perform.  But under the present system of narrow categorical grants, with dozens of federal agencies, scurrying to and from Washington, tailoring their budgets to meet the available programs, drafting scores of applications and reports for the satisfaction of federal civil servants.  This is why no one thinks it odd or disingenuous when a big city mayor seeks to blame all of his trouble on Washington.  The central purpose of revenue sharing is to free these officials, to give them the capacity and the responsibility to accomplish themselves the difficult tasks for which the voters elected them.

But, Mr. Karmin notes, the effect of removing those federal strings will likely be to “dilute” the funds that are now focused on the central cities.  Good management and good political science, perhaps, but a bad deal for the poor.  Other writers have made a similar but much harsher point: state and local governments, they say, are dominated by racists, reactionaries and even Republicans, who are bound to turn their backs on the poor once the federal agencies loosen their grip.  What’re Sam Yorty and George Wallace going to do with all that cash anyway?

Disregarding the Obvious

The latter argument (not Mr. Karmin’s) shows a remarkable ability to disregard the obvious, especially coming as it so often does from mid-town Manhattan.  The mayors of our large cities are, on the whole, the most progressive-minded public officials in American politics, certainly far more “liberal” than their respective congressional delegations.  In this they are followed closely by the nation’s governors, again taken as a group.  Surely these men can be trusted to look out for the interests of the poor and the interest of minorities with at least as much energy and commitment as any others in American government.  If, as Mr. Karmin anticipates, revenue sharing funds are more “universalized” and less focused on the physical confines of the poorest neighborhoods, that is not necessarily against the interest of the poor or the cities.  The notion of “targeting” funds on discrete neighborhoods was central to the original operation of the Model Cities program, and before long it was precisely this feature that governors, mayors and Model Cities directors alike were imploring Washington to change.  And is there a big city mayor who thinks his city’s most serious social problems can be solved wholly within the city limits?

Of course each of us can think of state and local politicians whom we would hardly trust to take to heart the interests of the poor or anyone else: they may have obnoxious political views, may be corrupt, or may be simply incompetent.  Such men are mercifully few, but what of them?

If they are men of extreme political views, it must be admitted that they represent public resentments that cannot be ignored.  It seems likely that we are destined now for a full generation of fairly high and constant social friction.  In such times James Madison’s famous maxim, that federalism is the best protection against the formation of national factions, holds with especial force.  The Max Raferties of American politics (read in your favorite political villain, right or left) are bound to have their day: far better at the local level than nationally.  They will find government far more ambiguous and complicated than they had imagined.  They will have to learn to negotiate and compromise just like the rest of us, or be swiftly retired back to private life.  (It should be noted here that federal civil rights laws will apply fully to all revenue sharing funds.)

If they are corrupt, it is noteworthy that it is in state and local governments that opportunities for corruption abound.  And this is in large part because these governments are heavily dependent on taxing schemes—taxes on real estate values and race tracks, for example—which vest in relatively obscure officials and altogether unhealthy degree of discretion over private economic activities.  Revenue sharing (federally audited) will reduce this dependence and increase the use of automatic, corruption-proof taxes.

A Solution for Incompetence

If they are simply incompetent, obviously the only solution is for more competent people to become involved in state and local governments.  Today the brightest men and women seek federal office, or at least federal employment, because that is where the opportunities are for leadership and achievement.  State and local governments will not attract large numbers of these people until they offer equal challenges.

The wonder is that, under present arrangements, so many able people go into local government at all.  When John F. Kennedy was an ambitious young Congressman planning his political career, he avoided running for governor of Massachusetts because he didn’t want to be “handing out sewer contracts.”  Sewer contracts have become much more fashionable since then, as concern over pollution has mounted.  And as concern over a host of other, more difficult, urban problems has mounted, so has the importance of other governmental tasks that once were considered mundane and lacking in glamour.  Revenue sharing would go a long way toward seeing that they are performed wisely and well.