Of course, much has changed since 1979, when Congress passed the TRA following President Carter's recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legal government of China. At that time, the Cold War was at its height and containing communism was a major objective of U.S. foreign policy. Today, the Cold War is over and our foreign policy seems to have little, if any, focus.

One thing that hasn't changed, however, is the United States' goals in its relations with Taiwan, as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act. The Act declares that the United States will:

• Preserve and promote extensive, close and friendly commercial and cultural relations between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan.
• View any effort to determine Taiwan's future by aggressive means, including boycotts or embargoes, as a threat to regional peace and security.
• Provide Taiwan with defensive arms, based on what the president and Congress judge to be Taiwan's needs.
• Maintain the ability to resist any military force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social and economic systems, of the people of Taiwan.
• Preserve and protect the human rights of the people of Taiwan.
• Oppose the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from membership in any international organization.

It's important to remember why Congress drafted the TRA in the first place—because of understandable concerns that Taiwan would otherwise be abandoned. When President Carter announced that the United States would break diplomatic relations with Taipei and recognize Beijing as the lone seat of China's government effective Jan. 1, 1979, he barely acknowledged the need to maintain relations with Taiwan. The TRA was designed to fill that void. It was approved with broad bipartisan support; its strongest advocates included liberals like Sen. Ted Kennedy, Massachusetts Democrat, and conservatives like Sen. Jesse Helms, North Carolina Republican. The TRA was signed by President Carter on April 10, 1979.

Speaking as a presidential candidate in August 1980, Ronald Reagan affirmed the need for the TRA: "It was the timely action of the Congress, reflecting the strong support of the American people for Taiwan, that forced the changes in the inadequate bill which Mr. Carter proposed. Clearly, the Congress was unwilling to buy the Carter plan, which it believed would have jeopardized Taiwan's security."

In the ensuing 20 years, the TRA has weathered several diplomatic challenges. In 1982, for example, the Reagan administration agreed through a diplomatic communique to gradually reduce the quantity and quality of arms sold to Taiwan if Beijing used peaceful means to deal with the island republic. When asked if this move contradicted U.S. obligations under the TRA, President Reagan responded, "We are not going to abandon our longtime friends and allies on Taiwan. And I'm going to carry out the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act . . . It is a moral obligation that we'll keep."

And he did. Prior to signing the 1982 communique, President Reagan offered what became known as the "Six Assurances," in which he promised the government of Taiwan that the United States remained committed to the TRA.

Unfortunately, recent actions by the Clinton administration have implicitly called these commitments into question. The most egregious example of this shift occurred last June, when President Clinton, while in Shanghai, endorsed a key element of Beijing's Taiwan policy—the "Three Noes": No U.S. support for "one China, one Taiwan"; no U.S. support for Taiwanese independence; and no U.S. support for Taiwanese membership in various international organizations. While this last point clearly violates the letter and intent of the TRA, the entire statement represents a sharp departure from longstanding U.S. policy toward Taiwan. As in 1979, it may be necessary for Congress to affirm America's commitment to Taiwan to ensure America stands by its pledges.

The reason for Taiwan's concern that U.S. policy is tilting too far toward Beijing is clear enough given the Clinton administration's policies. The president continues to pursue a "constructive strategic partnership" with the PRC. At the same time, he does nothing to recognize and reward Taiwan, which should be our real partner in the region. What has the administration gained by accommodating Beijing, other than the deployment of more PRC missiles to threaten Taiwan?

The TRA works. To abandon it—in principle, if not in fact—would be a grave mistake. By consistently supporting Taiwan over the last two decades, the United States has promoted a dramatic transformation in that country. Freedom has spread from the marketplace to the ballot box, making Taiwan one of Asia's best and proudest examples of a free-market democracy. The 21 million people on Taiwan buy nearly twice as many American goods as the 1.2 billion people on the mainland. Its economic success alone is a lesson for all of us. Its political transformation could not have happened without the security guarantees of the TRA.

As an important first step toward giving Taiwan its due recognition, the U.S. government should receive Taiwan's democratically elected leaders in the United States. If the Clinton administration can deal publicly with Fidel Castro and Yasser Arafat, how can it continue to turn its back on the democratically chosen officials of Taiwan?

It is now up to Congress to keep the simple goals of the Taiwan Relations Act alive. Consistent with the "moral obligation" described by President Reagan, the United States must do all it can to guarantee Taiwan's ability to live in peace and prosperity. In short, it's time to replace the "Three Noes" with a resounding "Yes."

Christopher DeMuth is president of the American Enterprise Institute and Edwin Feulner is president of the Heritage Foundation.